Biggio vs. Alomar (and Sandberg)

There are few players that are as polarizing as Craig Biggio. Obviously, this is through no fault of his own. Through most accounts, he played hard and he played the game right for 20 seasons. The reasons for his polarizing nature are based on how people perceive his career. Naturally, Astros fans think he is one of the all-time greats based on some impressive counting numbers. People on the east and west coast think he is one of the more overrated players in the history of the game.

Chief among these was professional talking head Mike Francesa. He steadfastly believed that Biggio shouldn’t get in and called him a glorified singles hitter. The numbers say something else as they almost always do. That is the defense against the “I know them when I see them” crowd. On top of that, systems like the index reveal the problems with the counting numbers that see below. Here are Biggio’s career ranks amongst primary second basemen in history.

Hits: 3060 (3rd)

2B: 668 (1st)

HR: 291 (4th)

TB: 4711 (2nd)

BB: 1160 (7th)

SB: 414 (6th)

RC: 1832 (2nd)

Much of the debate in Francesa’s case was a Craig Biggio vs. Roberto Alomar debate. Of course, the numbers here clearly point to Biggio as any Houston fan would attest, but they aren’t necessarily completely right either. Counting numbers can be deceiving. Add in runs and RBI and it becomes that much more of a stacked deck. It might lead you to believe he was a top five second basemen in history. As we will see, that’s a bit far fetched.

Career Value 

bWAR fWAR WS/5 Total
Craig Biggio 65.5 65.8 85.3 216.6
Ryne Sandberg 68.0 60.9 69.2 198.1
Roberto Alomar 67.1 63.6 67.0 197.7

The index is different from counting numbers because one must have value to accrue career value. Well duh. However, it is easy to miss how this differs from even sophisticated counting numbers like runs created. Would anyone in their right mind really suggest Biggio was the second best second sacker in history? The fact is that playing for 20 seasons (and most of them healthy seasons) has a way of helping you accrue those numbers. Unfortunately, his last few seasons saw him add very little if any real value.

Of course, Francesa was quick to point out that Biggio was not as good with the glove as Alomar. This is both true and misleading. Biggio was not a good defender by most metrics, but neither was Alomar. Alomar won Gold Gloves because Alomar made it into the highlights almost every night. Defensive metrics don’t add up Web Gems. They add up assists, putouts, double plays, and yes even errors. More advanced systems use video to determine how many plays a player should have made in comparison with the plays he did make. You don’t get extra credit for diving stops or acrobatic throws.

The index includes both offense and fielding. If we go only according to the index we would have put him in our last grouping with the likes of Charlie Gehringer, Rod Carew, and Frankie Frisch. As we will see, there are reasons not to include him in that group. However, he compares favorably to Sandberg and Alomar. Before we go to the offensive and fielding numbers we should probably look at peak value numbers.

Peak Value 

bWAR fWAR WS/5 Total
Ryne Sandberg 56.7 51.6 55.6 163.9
Craig Biggio 52.2 51.3 57.1 160.6
Roberto Alomar 50.4 47.6 48.9 146.9

One of the things we notice when looking at this data is Biggio’s significant advantage in win shares. Why does this happen? Simply put, the Astros were consistently competitive throughout Biggio’s career. Their only real down seasons came in 1991 and 2000. Otherwise, they were usually in the playoff hunt every year. Since win shares are based on wins that would give him that advantage.

Sandberg famously missed two seasons after a premature retirement that didn’t take. He tried to save his first marriage and it wouldn’t be saved. Give him even two mediocre seasons and he likely would be in Biggio territory in career value and might have surpassed his peak value. Of course, he isn’t the focus of this particular debate. Most of us know what Sandberg was and there isn’t a particular amount of debate there. Before we move onto the meaty part of the debate we will clean up the index with the totals.

Hall of Fame Index 

Career Peak Total
Craig Biggio 216.6 160.6 377.2
Ryne Sandberg 198.1 163.9 362.0
Roberto Alomar 197.7 146.9 344.4

The index scores put Biggio in the group that we mentioned last time, but he also hung out for a long time. We will ignore counting numbers because counting numbers tend to get skewed as players play for a long time. Biggio probably played two or three years past his usefulness in order to get to 3000 hits. The Astros obliged because of all he did for them and they got some marketing out of the deal. Let’s tear all that away and look at the facts.

Offensive Numbers 

OPS+ Rbaser OW% wRC+ wOBA
Biggio 112 54 .597 115 .352
Alomar 116 54 .600 118 .359
Sandberg 114 33 .620 115 .351

 Francesa argued that Biggio didn’t belong in the Hall of Fame period. The numbers above show that point to be ludicrous on its face. Alomar was better, but these are career numbers and were based on all 20 years for Biggio. While he added singles, doubles, and home runs down the stretch, he also added strikeouts and suffered through down OBP and SLG years. The Astrodome was already accounted for, so fellow Astros fans can rest assured Biggio wasn’t punished here.

Still, you can argue that Alomar was a better player based on these numbers. I have to wonder if we looked at the peak value numbers whether that would still be the case. Yet, when all things are considered if you admit one you have to admit them all based on this data alone. They are just too close. Since we can go back to the peak years, let’s check it out.

OPS+ Rbaser OW% wRC+ wOBA
Alomar 127 36 .634 128 .383
Biggio 125 32 .646 129 .373

We can start with the obvious comparison, but these numbers are proof of something else. When you look at these players you must look at them over the course of their careers and when they are at their best. Biggio held on longer, so his numbers took a bigger dive. Considering that each of them were better in some categories than others we can only conclude that they are very close if not equal when they were at their best. At least offensively that is.

Fielding Numbers

Rfield TZ DWAR DWS
Sandberg 60 60 13.5 89.0
Alomar -38 -3 3.3 95.5
Biggio -100 -33 -2.9 86.0

By all accounts, Alomar was not as brilliant a defender as people seem to remember. The numbers say something else. What’s more, he almost exclusively played at second base. Biggio played behind the dish for a few years, in left field for a few seasons, and in center field. He was not particularly good at any of them admittedly, but he might have been had he been given the opportunity to play their exclusively. This is likely wishful thinking though.

This brings us to the ultimate question. Who would you rather have on your team? This is an impossible question to ask definitively. If you want longevity it’s Biggio. If you want top end performance it might be Alomar, but that is closer than it appears. Alomar was the better defender, but Biggio offered more flexibility. The choice is yours.

Second Basemen: The Next Tier

When the book was published, I broke down players into groups within the Hall of Fame. Of course, that was back when we included the players from the Veteran’s Committee. We haven’t had to do that this time, but occasionally we see pretty clear divisions amongst the BBWAA selections. Second base is one of those instances. We’ve already taken a look at the top four guys at the position and we have four more who were very close.

The index usually reveals this, but we have Jackie Robinson as a part of our list this time around. He did not make his debut until he was 28, so he obviously did not put up the kind of career numbers as the other three guys. We will look at the offensive numbers and fielding numbers as well to see how similar these players were.

Career Value 

  bWAR fWAR WS/5 Total
Charlie Gehringer 80.7 78.6 76.6 235.9
Rod Carew 81.3 72.3 76.8 230.4
Frankie Frisch 70.4 74.8 73.2 218.4
Jackie Robinson 61.4 57.2 51.4 170.0

Let’s assume that Robinson had four additional seasons. If we take his first four seasons in the big leagues and simply repeat them then we get some idea of how valuable he would have been over the course of a full career. So, if we look at the numbers we can go ahead and add them in.

  bWAR fWAR WS/5 Total
Adjusted 25.6 24.7 22.2 72.5
New Total 87.0 81.9 73.6 242.5

Of course, this is our best guess. There are any number of factors that could effect where Robinson would have ended up. Even if we assume he would have had four full seasons more on the front end, that doesn’t mean he would have finished at the same time. You also have the adjustment period at the beginning of every career. Seasons five through eight may have been even better. These push and pull factors make it impossible to guess accurately, but the above score is a pretty good estimate.

So, from here on out, we can see that all four of these players are fairly close in terms of overall career value. How they produced that value was somewhat different. That’s always part of the fun of these sorts of studies. As you might imagine, their peak values are far different and obviously put their careers in different lights.

Peak Value

  BWAR FWAR WS/5 Total
Charlie Gehringer 62.2 60.9 55.6 178.8
Jackie Robinson 61.4 57.2 51.4 170.0
Frankie Frisch 55.8 59.1 50.6 165.5
Rod Carew 59.3 52.3 50.0 161.6

You’ll notice that these players flipped positions. That obviously means the combined scores will end up being closer than the career values appeared. Gehringer is clearly the standard bearer of this group when we take Robinson’s career at face value. However, we see that the rest of the list is inverted. Before we consider the total index, we should probably take a look at the award voting to see how these players were perceived during their career.

  MVP Top 5 Top 10 Top 25
Charlie Gehringer 1 2 4 3
Rod Carew 1 2 3 2
Frankie Frisch 1 2 1 5
Jackie Robinson 1 1 2 4

So, these players are still rather similar when we compare their finishes in the awards voting. Robinson finished in the top 16 in the awards voting in eight out of his ten seasons. That includes his last season when he played in only 117 games. Frisch finished in the top 25 nine times, Carew eight times, and Gehringer ten times. That’s a pretty tight grouping, so we don’t learn much in terms of finding separation. We will have to look at the offensive and fielding numbers for that. First, let’s combine the career and peak value.

Hall of Fame Index 

  Career Peak Total
Charlie Gehringer 235.9 178.7 414.6
Rod Carew 230.4 161.6 392.0
Frankie Frisch 218.4 165.5 383.9
Jackie Robinson 170.0 170.0 340.0

So, we have three players that are relatively close and we have Robinson who is obviously in a different category. However, when we look at the offensive and fielding numbers we see he really does belong in this group. Even if we set the index at 350 we would still take all of them in the Hall of Fame, but it is still fun to break them down according to their numbers.

Offensive Production 

  OPS+ RBaser OW% wRC+ wOBA
Gehringer 124 9 .665 124 .405
Carew 131 26 .670 132 .369
Frisch 110 29 .603 112 .370
Robinson 132 30 .687 135 .406

So, when we dial away the index and look at it’s components we find that Robinson has a very definite claim as the best performer of the bunch. He was the best hitter and the best base runner of the bunch. It should be no surprise that he had the best wRC+ and offensive winning percentage of the bunch. Even more impressive, he had the best wOBA even though he did not play in as good a hitting era as Gehringer and Frisch.

Carew played in a more depressed offensive time and he was not as dynamic offensively as the others (save for Frisch). Many that saw him play later in his career remember the brilliant singles hitter that couldn’t do much else. Early in his career he was a brilliant base runner as well. Robinson and Frisch were good runners as well. Even Gehringer was good comparatively. It’s a group without any major weaknesses.

Scouts and fans are mesmerized by the five tools and assume that every tool is created equal. So, they compare the base running totals along with the power and on base numbers as if they are equal. That goes for fielding as well. Frisch is a cut below offensively, but always had a stellar defensive reputation. Let’s see if it is warranted.

Fielding Numbers 

  TZ DWS DWS/1000 DWAR
Gehringer 34 86.8 4.49 10.7
Carew 16 39.3 4.19 -1.7
Frisch 140 83.9 5.42 21.6
Robinson 81 37.7 5.94 10.1

Let’s start with win shares. We had to add the per 1000 innings category because most of these players played other positions for a good portion of their careers. The defensive win shares represent their numbers only at second base. So, Carew and Robinson look worse than they really are. When we switch over to the per 1000 innings category we see that Robinson is actually the best defender.

Unfortunately, these numbers aren’t interval in nature. In other words, they really don’t build on each other. We use them to get a general sense of how each player compares with each other. With the exception of win shares per 1000 innings, Frisch appears to be the best fielder of the bunch. That particularly comes into focus when looking at total zone runs (and baseball-reference’s Rfield) and defensive WAR.

If you are looking at defensive WAR for the first time you should know some of the peculiarities in how it is compiled. Players are compared in one universe of value, so middle infielders are more important than corner infielders. This is important because Robinson and Carew spent time at third base and first base in their careers. Carew comes out negative because most first basemen come out negative. Frisch shifted over to shortstop on occasion, so he wins on degree of difficulty.

Frisch obviously has to be considered the standard amongst these four and might look that way when compared to the elite group as well. However, how would he look when compared to the guys with stellar defensive reputations that are in the Hall of Fame. So, we include Bid McPhee, Nap Lajoie, and Bill Mazeroski into the conversation.

  TZ DWAR DWS DWS/1000
Bid McPhee 154 16.2 98.7 5.25
Nap Lajoie 83 10.1 85.7 4.69
Frankie Frisch 140 21.6 83.9 5.42
Bill Mazeroski 147 24.0 112.2 6.13

This is one of the few times where reputation and evidence meets. Mazeroski has the reputation as the best fielding second baseman in history and the numbers seem to reveal the same thing. Of course, the others played other positions which affected the numbers up or down. The total defensive win shares were those only compiled at second base. So, they likely would have finished closer, but the win shares per 1000 innings indicate that Maz is the king with the glove.

As we saw in the book though, Hall of Famers have to be great players overall. Maz’s entire value came with the glove. Frisch was very valuable defensively and at least brought some value with the bat. When you add his fielding and hitting he becomes as valuable as Gehringer, Carew, and Robinson.

What About: Jorge Posada

In 2000, Eddie Epstein and Rob Neyer wrote “Baseball’s Dynasties: The Greatest Teams of All-time.” The book is the definitive outlook on the game’s greatest teams. Fifteen teams were selected from the 20th century. Nearly half of those teams had a Hall of Fame catcher. Of course, I’ve mentioned this before, but no other single position is more represented in Cooperstown amongst the teams in that book.

You may be wondering what this has to do with the price of tea, but it should be no surprise that the 1998 Yankees were the last team covered in that book. In addition to the six Hall of Fame catchers, the other teams were represented by some darn good ones. Johnny Kling, Chief Meyers, and Gene Tenace have their champions in the baseball community. Elston Howard was a darn good one during his prime as well. Some people even champion Walker Cooper of the Cardinals as well.

This brings us to Jorge Posada of the latest Yankees dynasty. Dynasties have to have some serendipity on their side. You obviously have to have great players, but sometimes you need good players that happen to play great. Then, you get unsung players that come out of nowhere and have a great season. Every championship team has those guys. So, was Posada a great player, a good one that was great at the right time, or was he one of those guys that came out of nowhere?

The comparisons with Howard are probably apt, but Posada was a really good catcher for about a decade. For whatever reason, he likely will not muster the value needed to be seriously considered by the BBWAA. It was to the point where I did not seriously consider him when looking at the modern candidates. However, considering his place on one of the greatest teams in history, he deserves a longer look. Let’s start with the index.

  bWAR fWAR WS/5 Total
Career Value 42.8 44.7 51.6 139.1
Peak Value 39.8 40.4 43.0 123.2
Total 82.6 85.1 94.6 262.3

It would be easy enough to drop it right here, but that would be disrespectful to a pretty darn good player. When you get to 260 in the index you are a very good player in the history of the game. There are those that would claim that good players should be inducted into the Hall of Fame. It is a museum after all and if they were instrumental in the success of a good team then you can make that argument. The trouble there is that you have others that were also good players that didn’t have the opportunity to play on a good team. When you mention Howard you see a really good historical comparison.

  AVG OBP SLG HR Runs RBI
Elston Howard .274 .322 .427 167 619 762
Jorge Posada .273 .374 .474 275 900 1065

Howard has fame because he hit .348 with 21 home runs for the 1961 Yankees. He is the perfect example of a good player having a great season at the right time. Posada was good for longer, but the career numbers above show he probably came up just a little short. Of course, the interaction between the career and peak value numbers show you that as well. Still, his 121 OPS+ compares favorably to the other catchers in the Hall of Fame. So, why are his numbers so lackluster. Fortunately for us, Posada played at a time when we had a better understanding of all that went into catcher defense. Below we look at the numbers that compose defensive runs saved since they were compiled in 2003.

  ADJ ER Strikes SB Bunts GFP/DME Total Rank
2003 -5 0 3 0 0 -2 29
2004 -3 0 -2 -1 -6 -12 35
2005 -2 0 0 0 2 0 5
2006 -3 0 4 0 -4 -3 19
2007 -1 0 -6 0 -6 -13 35
2008 -1 0 -4 0 0 -5
2009 -10 0 -1 0 -5 -16 35
2010 -2 -16 -6 -1 -5 -30 35

The Fielding Bible system remains the most comprehensive system that is available to the average fan. Teams likely have more complex data to go by, but recent seasons have seen pitch framing data (strikes here) added since 2010. It is likely Posada would have been substandard going back to the late 1990s in that department. Add to that his deficiencies in calling a game (Adjusted ER) and you can see he has an uphill battle. He showed some ability to throw out would be basestealers, but he also was not good at blocking pitches in the dirt. The end result was that he was the worst defensive catcher in baseball in three out of his last four seasons as a regular catcher and once more in 2004. Again, we have no idea of what happened before 2003, but judging by the other numbers it wasn’t pretty.

This is usually where one of those old-school guys comes out and says, “well I’d like to see you catch in the big leagues.” I agree. I could never do it. This isn’t saying that Posada was a bad catcher. Good and bad are comparative in nature. We have to look at what value he brought to the table and that can only be done by comparing him with other catchers. So, he may have been a good catcher, but compared to the other catchers in the game he was not as valuable defensively.

Baseball-reference had him rated at -60 Rfield runs and Fangraphs had him rated him at -7 total zone runs. So, add in the -80 defensive runs saved and you can see that no one was a big fan of his work. So, yes, Posada was a really good hitter and you could compare him with his teammate Derek Jeter. The difference is that Jeter enjoyed a few more prime seasons.

Second Basemen: The Elites

One of the more fun activities in sports is debating who the best player is at a particular position. The index can play a part in that debate, but it was never really designed to be a definitive answer to that question. Second base is one of those positions where the answer is not necessarily universal. It all depends on what you want out of a second baseman and how important level of competition is. We will begin with the index and expand our search outwards to include the various parts of the game.

Career Value

  bWAR fWAR WS/5 Total
Eddie Collins 124.0 120.5 114.8 359.3
Rogers Hornsby 127.0 130.3 100.4 357.7
Nap Lajoie 107.4 102.2 99.2 308.8
Joe Morgan 100.6 98.8 102.4 301.8

The results here are shocking enough. Most people naturally assumed that Hornsby would top the list and I did too when I first compiled it. The difference is slight obviously, but it comes in Collins’ major advantage. He was a major player for nearly two decades. Hornsby didn’t last nearly as long, but he was legitimately an all-time great for more than a decade. However, that will come when we look peak value.

Lajoie is an interesting player because he is the first player we have that straddles the19th century and 20th century. In some cases this throws value into question because the competitive nature of the league was uneven in the early years. However, by the 1890s we can assume there was some uniformity. Most of his value came after the turn of the century, so we can logically keep him here. Lajoie becomes more intriguing when we start breaking down the individual components.

This leaves us with Morgan. Morgan obviously the only player from the modern game and as such played in a multi-chrome environment. This is where terms like greatest and most dominant can be conflated. Morgan was clearly not more dominant than the other three but given arguments about the quality of play we could claim he was the greatest. Then, those arguments are based on certain assumptions too. Let’s move onto peak value and quickly put the index part of the argument to bed.

Peak Value 

  bWAR fWAR WS/5 Total Index
Rogers Hornsby 93.1 96.2 72.4 261.7 619.4
Eddie Collins 78.3 77.2 75.4 230.9 590.2
Nap Lajoie 75.0 72.6 64.2 211.8 520.6
Joe Morgan 77.2 66.5 63.0 206.7 508.5

One of the notions of the index is the notion of separation. It is designed to separate players as much as possible for Hall of Fame fitness analysis. You take career value and peak value for instance. One is part of the other, but when you put it together it often separates players purposely. The same is true when we use three different statistical sources. Occasionally, we get some honest disagreement and that is where it pays to shine a light and see what is going on.

Eddie Collins had more win shares for his career and during his peak than Hornsby. That begs the question why. WAR exists in a runs environment. Wins are parceled out on a ten-run basis. The idea is that performance occurs in the aggregate. Over a long enough time period all of the hiccups of clutch performance will even themselves. At least that is the idea behind. The creators will tell you that it isn’t necessarily meant to be leant on over a year to year basis. It becomes more accurate the further away you stand.

Win shares are parceled out based on wins. This creates a bit of an issue itself. Players are rewarded based on their placement on a good team. In an aggregate environment, when individual performance improves team performance improves. Unfortunately, it isn’t an exact ratio though. So, it is possible that some players benefit from collective performance or suffer from a lack of support. Yet, it is also possible that when a player performs is more important than simply leaning on the aggregate. Proven clutch performers deserve credit for performing in those situations and WAR simply doesn’t do that. Does Collins benefit simply by being on better teams or he was he honestly a better performer when it mattered? That remains to be seen.

Offensive Numbers

 When we distill out counting numbers we often see a very clear picture of who was the more valuable offensive player. The trouble is that we are really only considering what occurred in the batter’s box. Historians, statisticians, and scouts all agree that what occurs in the batter’s box trumps everything else most of the time, but we can obviously debate to the percentages involved. Here, we see mostly how each player performed against the league with the exception of bases per out. We will cover that down the line.

  wOBA wRC+ OW% BPO
Rogers Hornsby .459 173 .815 1.049
Eddie Collins .409 144 .715 .796
Nap Lajoie .401 144 .758 .777
Joe Morgan .372 135 .702 .818

To give us some idea we will start with offensive winning percentage. In a 162 game schedule, a team made of these players would win at least 113 games a season. The 2001 Mariners set the modern record with 116 wins in 2001. So, these players in their prime were better than the 2001 Mariners even with average pitching and fielding. A team made up of nine Rogers Hornsby’s would win 132 games on average. That is patently ridiculous.

Quite frankly. Hornsby is in the conversation for best right-handed hitter in the history of the game. It really isn’t fair to compare the other players to him, but they do compare favorably to each other. Morgan comes a little short, but we have to keep in mind that it is more difficult to separate yourself in the modern game. Expansion watered down the league and mitigated the effects of deviation. In other words, the standard deviation would be lower, so he might have been better.

Bases per out is a hybrid number meant to show how valuable a hitter was. It unfortunately is not normed like the other numbers, so the raw scores can be misinterpreted. Lajoie and Collins played in the Dead Ball Era when offensive numbers were depressed overall. So, seeing Morgan end up a little higher can be somewhat deceiving. Still, this is just one more category where Hornsby dominates. Naturally, this would lead most to just assume that he was the best of all-time, but there is more to the game than what happens in the batter’s box.

Fielding Numbers

  BR FG DWS WSGG
Nap Lajoie +83 +79 85.7 4
Rogers Hornsby +54 +30 59.6 1
Eddie Collins +35 +40 107.5 8
Joe Morgan -48 -43 90.8 0

Yeah, but but but Joe Morgan won five Gold Gloves! Again, we see the folly of relying on Rawlings to tell who us who the most valuable fielder was. The system is rife with bias first of all, but more importantly only one of our players was eligible for the awards. In the past, we have looked at total zone awards and Fielding Bible awards for the modern players, but here will have to stick win shares on an individual year in and year out basis.

Based on his finish here, we can safely eliminate Morgan from the discussion of who would be the most valuable second baseman of all-time. Of course, the discussion on the greatest second baseman rages on. Morgan combined power, speed, and patience like no other player at the position. Unfortunately, he wasn’t quite dominant enough with the bat or the glove.

Of course, win shares are indicative of value over time. Morgan is second all-time in defensive innings at second base, so it makes perfect sense for him to be second in defensive win shares. The win share Gold Gloves are more indicative of defensive value from year to year. Hornsby had some defensive flexibility, but he was not valuable at any position he played according to win shares. The baseball-reference and Fangraphs metrics said he was better than the average second baseman.

This is the primary reason why we do not compile fielding statistics like we do with the index. Fangraphs and baseball-reference compare players with the average at the position while win shares compiles from the replacement level. When you have two different frames of reference you end up having two different results. The take away is that Eddie Collins was likely the best of the four and the most valuable over time. Lajoie was second in terms of greatness but had fewer innings than the others.

While it would seem prudent to eliminate Morgan at this point, those that watched him play would harp on his baserunning as an advantage. One of the peculiarities of scouting is that scouts often salivate over the so-called five tool player. Since fielding and throwing go hand in hand, that often means hitting, hitting for power, and running. The trouble is that they assume every tool is equal. That being said, we should look at baserunning before we write off Morgan.

Baserunning Statistics 

  BsR Rbaser
Joe Morgan 79.0 80.0
Eddie Collins 42.3 40.0
Rogers Hornsby -1.8 -9.0
Nap Lajoie -3.0 -11.0

There is a distinct difference ordinal and interval data. Your ranking of these second baseman largely depends on your adherence to either ordinal or interval data. Ordinal data simply ranks each player in order. In that case, Eddie Collins would be your man. He ranks either first or second in every category individually. So, while Hornsby was the best hitter, he was clearly deficient in fielding and running.

Morgan becomes viable when you consider each facet of the game individually, but when you consider it altogether you get to interval data. That asks how much better someone is than someone else. This is where we discover that hitting is more valuable than fielding which is more valuable than baserunning. So, we can salivate over the five tools, but we need to keep it all in perspective.

Rogers Hornsby’s advantage with the bat is probably enough to carry him when we add in fielding and baserunning. However, the finish is a lot closer than it would appear. In a qualitative way, people might prefer a more well-rounded player and Eddie Collins is the most well-rounded second baseman.

Modern First Basemen

First base is always a position that is loaded with Hall of Fame candidates. So, when we look at modern first basemen we have to divide them into two distinct groups. There are those that are retired, but are not yet eligible to be on the Hall of Fame ballot and then there are those that are still active. Players must wait five years to become eligible for the ballot. As it happens, there are a few interesting candidates in addition to David Ortiz who we profiled last time.

Recently Retired candidates

Two of the three candidates for the Hall of Fame have serious issues getting in the way of their candidacy. Todd Helton retired after the 2013 season after 17 seasons in Colorado. Most critics point to the fact that he played half of his games a mile above sea level. Coors Field has a way of inflating numbers. Of course, that is one of the reasons why we employ something like the index to distill out the effects of the home ballpark. Just to be sure, we ought to take a look at what the critics are talking about.

  AVG OBP SLG HR Runs RBI
Home .345 .441 .607 227 874 859
Away .287 .386 .469 142 527 547

In some ways, you could say that the hullabaloo over Coors Field is overblown. Some people think the hitters are ordinary outside of Denver. That might have been true of players like Dante Bichette and Vinny Castilla, but Helton was a cut above. An .855 road OPS is nothing to sneeze at. If you multiple the road numbers by two you see a guy with 284 career home runs, 1054 runs scored, and 1094 RBI. That’s not Hall of Fame worthy, but it also assumes completely neutral home statistics. It is not uncommon for players to enjoy a little bump at home.

Jason Giambi was of course implicated in the whole steroids era as a user. Late in his career, he came out and made a tearful apology for doing wrong without specifically mentioning steroids. Unlike Helton, he won an MVP award and probably should have won two. By any accounts, he was the best player in the American League in 2001 by a significant margin, but the world was captivated by Ichrio Suzuki.

Giambi supposedly admitted to using human growth hormone and steroids for three seasons beginning in 2003. If that is true then we can surmise he was clean for the last ten years of his career and the first six years of his career. If we buy his timeline then his best two seasons were played clean. Of course, as we know from the Mitchell Report, Oakland was one of the epicenters of the steroid culture. Heck, it was where Balco was housed.

For the time being, we will buy his timeline and say he only used when he was in New York. Still, we can’t help but question his account because it sounds eerily similar to Alex Rodriguez’s account. They were clean until they got paid tens of millions of dollars. That doesn’t remotely seem plausible, but whatever. We will consider the index scores for these two players and Mark Teixeira.

  bWAR fWAR WS/5 Total
Todd Helton 61.2 54.8 63.6 177.6
Jason Giambi 50.5 49.7 65.0 165.2
Mark Teixeira 51.8 44.5 53.2 149.5

Helton looks awfully good when we look at career value. We can discount the numbers all we want, but he produced with the bat and the glove. In fact, when we look at the fielding numbers for all three players we can definitely see why Helton was a cut above according to the value numbers.

  DWAR UZR DWS
Todd Helton -5.5 25.7 43.7
Mark Teixeira 0.2 -4.9 37.5
Jason Giambi -19.8 -31.8 15.5

Teixeira played some at third base in his career, so when you take the defensive WAR methodology you can see why he comes out ahead. An average third baseman is worth more than an average first baseman in terms of replacement level performance. Add in win shares proclivity to give extra credit to players that played on winning teams and we can see why it would appear that Helton is not as good as people claim. UZR started in 2002, so Helton likely would have an even bigger advantage had we started from the beginning of his career.

Add it all up and we can see why Helton is a cut above the others in career value. In spite of all of that, he had only one top five finish in the MVP voting. He led the National League in bWAR in 2000 and finished in the top ten five different times in addition to that. Clearly, the BBWAA didn’t quite grasp his greatness. At least they didn’t in comparison with Jason Giambi. Of course, peak value is often the tiebreaker in these situations.

  bWAR fWAR WS/5 Total Index
Todd Helton 55.0 50.5 49.2 154.7 332.3
Jason Giambi 44.8 46.2 50.0 141.0 306.2
Mark Teixeira 47.9 42.0 46.2 136.1 285.6

We can comfortably eliminate Teixeira from Hall of Fame consideration. Like many others, he wasn’t healthy enough for long enough. However, it would appear that Helton should be in the Hall of Fame based on his index numbers. Giambi is a somewhat intriguing candidate given his MVP and career numbers, but the PED use and borderline score combine to do him in.

The Absurdity of Counting Statistics

There is one modern candidate who really doesn’t qualify as significant Hall of Fame candidate, but he does serve as a cautionary tale to the gods of counting numbers. Sports fans are captivated by round numbers. It’s easy to see why. In football, it’s the 1000 yard season for running backs and wide receivers. In basketball, it’s 20 points, 10 rebounds, and 10 assists per game. In baseball, it is our fascination with the .300 batting average, 100 runs scored, and 100 RBI. For pitchers, it is 20 wins and 300 strikeout seasons. Even if those numbers are universal throughout time, holding steadfastly to them seems foolish at times. Is there a remarkable difference between say 99 RBI and 103 RBI? Let’s bring back our Player A and Player B test. Numbers represent the beginning of the 2018 season for the modern player.

  AVG OBP SLG HR Runs RBI
Player A .273 .359 .487 370 1105 1274
Player B .288 .359 .488 311 982 1176

That is about as close as two players can get in terms of OPS. Of course, we are talking two different eras and these numbers are crude, but you would be hard pressed to call either one a significant Hall of Fame candidate. Are they good players? Clearly, most players don’t get to 300 career home runs and 1000 RBI. Furthermore, both players hit for a decent average and showed the ability to get on base.

We would surmise that Player A is slightly better, but Player B isn’t done playing yet. If he puts up one or two more decent seasons then he could be right there in all three run producing categories. As we have seen in the last two seasons, Player B is likely done as a productive player, but we are still early in the 2018 campaign. Stranger things have happened.

Player A is Gil Hodges. He had seven consecutive 100 RBI seasons when the Dodgers were at their best in the 1940s and 1950s. When you produce matters, but Player B is the Mets Adrian Gonzalez. In 2009, he hit .277 with a .407 OBP. He had a career high 119 walks and had the highest OPS in his career at .958. He also hit a career high 40 home runs. By all accounts it was a great season. Unfortunately, he only drove in 99 runs. Had he collected one more RBI he would have had nine consecutive 100 RBI seasons.

This isn’t to say that Gonzalez should be considered for the Hall of Fame. Quite the opposite, he hasn’t done nearly enough to warrant that and no self-respecting analyst is suggesting he should be. However, with that one more RBI you could claim he has a stronger case than Hodges. He matches those offensive contributions with four Gold Glove awards. By all accounts he has enjoyed a very good career. He’s also fallen off the table in the last two seasons. In other words, he just wasn’t good enough for long enough. Yet, with similar credentials you have seemingly brilliant analysts that will swear that Hodges is a Hall of Famer. At least one of their selling points are those seven consecutive seasons. Absurd? Yeah, I would agree.

Modern First Basemen

First base is usually a loaded position and now is no different. There are two absolute legends currently active and one more that probably will be should he remain healthy. One of the reasons for compiling lists like this is that it forces us to acknowledge greatness when it is right in front of us. Sometimes, we have to acknowledge greatness when it isn’t readily apparent.

Joey Votto is absolutely one of the greatest first basemen in history. Some people don’t see it. That might be because Cincinnati is a small market. It also might be because the Reds are practicing a scorched earth plan that will keep them near the basement for the forseeable future. It isn’t like they have enjoyed a lot of success in his career. That’s not his fault, but it is easier to recognize greatness when it is enjoyed on a great team. The biggest factor is that the skill that makes him great is not universally recognized as a skill. He gets on base more often than any player in the modern game. Walks aren’t sexy, but they matter. They matter a lot.

  bWAR fWAR WS/5 Total
Albert Pujols 98.4 89.1 92.0 280.5
Miguel Cabrera 68.9 67.6 75.6 212.1
Joey Votto 55.3 53.4 54.6 163.3

No, that is not an index total for Pujols. That is just career value. Of course, he is also a cautionary tale for projecting career value midway through a career. His Cardinal numbers are enough to get him by themselves, but he has been a very different player in Los Angeles. It is hard to argue that he has been worth the investment the Angels put in him. Naturally, it is hard to calculate what he has meant in advertising and marketing. He will get his 3000th hit probably by the time you finish reading this. I’m certainly not a public relations expert, but that has to be worth a ton. The simple numbers tell a different story.

  AVG OBP SLG HR Runs RBI
Cardinals .328 .420 .617 445 1291 1329
Angels .262 .317 .459 174 443 603

As bad as these numbers look, the reality is worse. He was one of the best fielding first basemen in the National League throughout his career in St. Louis. He is barely replacement level over the course of his time in Los Angeles. He will still go down as the second best first baseman ever, but we would have sworn he could have chased down Gehrig when we take just the Cardinal numbers. Even with two or three more prime years it might have been possible. That’s what you get for predicting the future.

Still, he should pass Willie Mays on the all-time home run list next season and he should pass 2000 career RBI this season if he plays most of the time. He has an outside chance of reaching 2000 runs scored and 700 home runs if he finishes out his contract with the Angels. So, make sure you get your commemorative promotional stuff at the ballpark as he approaches those milestones.

Cabrera gets lost in the shuffle because of Pujols. In the early going of 2018 he appears to be back on track. Since he is a few years younger than Pujols, he has an outside chance of reaching the same career milestones. Baseball hasn’t seen that level of production since Gehrig and Foxx were going back and forth in the 1920s and 1930s. Naturally, this leaves us with Votto. Votto is considerably younger and so he barely reaches the ten-year minimum. It also means his peak value and career value will be very similar. For obvious reasons I don’t feel comfortable projecting his career, but it seems fairly obvious that he is already there in terms of where the index pegs him.

  bWAR fWAR WS/5 Total Index
Albert Pujols 81.3 76.5 67.6 227.4 507.9
Miguel Cabrera 55.7 50.5 56.8 163.0 375.1
Joey Votto 55.2 53.5 54.0 162.7 326.0

Keep in mind that Votto is still technically in the midst of his ten-year peak. So, all he can do is add to his peak value at this point. It doesn’t seem outrageous to assert that he will be a superior peak value player when compared to Cabrera. It’s harder to assert career value since Cabrera is still adding to that total, but if Votto continues on his trajectory that could end up being the case. Thanks to baseball-reference.com we can compare where Votto is coming into 2018 to where Pujols was when exiting St. Louis. For fun, we will consider Cabrera’s tally as well through 11 seasons.

  AVG OBP SLG HR Runs RBI
Pujols .328 .420 .617 445 1291 1329
Cabrera .321 .399 .568 365 1064 1260
Votto .313 .428 .541 257 863 830

There are a couple of reasons why Votto’s totals are lower. First, he was called up late in 2007, so while that technically counts as his 11th season, he really has only had ten full seasons. Secondly, he missed considerable time in both 2012 and 2014 due to injury. Yet, he is as good a reason why we can’r rely on runs and RBI to tell us how good someone is as anyone in the history of the game. He is essentially as good as Cabrera was with the bat over those first eleven seasons, but both Cabrera and Pujols were surrounded by better teammates, so both players scored and drove in far more runs.

Runs and RBI are essentially opportunity statistics. You need someone on base to drive in and you need someone at the plate to drive you in. The Reds just have not been a good team over the totality of Votto’s career. Others would claim he is selfish to take all of those walks. He should swing the bat when there are runners on base. Simply put, this is backwards thinking. Your job as a hitter is to create runs. You create runs first and foremost by getting on base. Swinging at pitches out of the zone to drive in runs is not an efficient way to create runs.

The David Ortiz Debate

Normally, we would cover all of the modern first basemen at the same time, but occasionally you get a case that deserves more focus. David Ortiz retired following a seemingly brilliant career in 2016. He had one of the best closing seasons in baseball history and that should be enough to get him into the Hall of Fame. After all, he has more than 500 home runs and 1700 RBI.

The index has always been meant to be a guide. No statistical formula is meant to solve every puzzle. If David Ortiz’s candidacy is anything it is a puzzle. His counting numbers are no more a definitive statement on his fitness than anything else. However, they are a good place to start when looking at what the voters will be considering.

Runs: 1419 (89th)

RBI: 1768 (22nd)

HR: 541 (17th)

2B: 632 (10th)

OPS: .931 (35th)

EBH: 1192 (8th)

Of course, this is only a smattering of the career numbers that people would consider, but all of those numbers say pretty much the same thing. Ortiz was one of the best hitters in the modern era. So, it stands to reason that he would be a shoo in for the Hall of Fame. Of course he is. The question though is whether he should be.

Index

Before we take a look at the index we should look some of the peculiarities around it. There is a secret sauce that goes into it. Essentially, what we need to know for players like Ortiz is that bWAR and fWAR have built in a punishment in a way for designated hitters. It can be seen more readily in bWAR with their defensive WAR statistic. Win shares builds from zero, so if a player never plays in the field he is worth zero in terms of fielding shares. bWAR takes the replacement level player overall and builds defensive value from there. Therefore, most first basemen are below replacement level already and that is that much worse for designated hitters.

In most instances we would trust the index to give us an accurate assessment of a player’s value. In this case (and Edgar Martinez) we are not quite sure. Is it fair to penalize designated hitters? Of course, this is the main reason we use three sources of data for the index. We want to have a consensus. Unfortunately, a consensus does not necessarily mean the same thing as accurate or precise.

  bWAR fWAR WS/5 Total
Career 55.3 50.7 65.2 171.2
Peak 38.5 36.2 41.2 115.9
Total 93.8 86.9 106.4 287.1

If we were to follow the strict rules of the index, we would immediately eliminate Ortiz from consideration. The problem is that most of the BBWAA holds to those counting numbers. Counting numbers have to be considered in the context they were accrued. Ortiz played in a hitter’s ballpark, in an offensive era, and on one of the better teams in the time period. So, it is hard to discount the numbers above out of hand, but most people would agree with the notion that something doesn’t feel quite right.

  bWAR Rank RC Rank OW% Rank
2003 3.4 * 98 * .698 9
2004 4.3 * 135 4 .711 5
2005 5.2 8 149 2 .752 4
2006 5.8 6 152 1 .759 4
2007 6.4 6 156 2 .800 1
2008 1.7 * 79 * .627 *
2009 0.7 * 86 * .524 *
2010 2.8 * 102 * .671 9
2011 4.0 * 110 * .713 5
2012 3.2 * 84 * .799 *
2013 4.4 * 111 7 .727 4
2014 2.6 * 93 * .657 *
2015 3.1 * 104 10 .677 9
2016 5.2 * 130 5 .756 2

*did not finish in the top ten

It should be noted that Ortiz played in only 90 games in 2012, so he did not qualify to finish in the top ten in either runs created or offensive winning percentage. Had he played a full season he likely would have top five finishes in both of those categories. We obviously see that not playing in the field hurt him in terms of the value numbers we use for the index. That undoubtedly should be the case, but to what degree is anyone’s best guess. Runs created and offensive winning percentage demonstrate he was one of the most valuable offensive players from the period.

Playoff Success

One of the many arguments used to support a player like Ortiz and his greatness is his reputation as a clutch performer. There are any number of ways to measure that, but we begin with the notion itself. Does clutch performance exist? The working theories have varied over time with the luminaries of the sport vacillating from one extreme to the other. Conventional wisdom says it must exist. When sabermetrics first began we naturally assumed that when the sample size is large enough then performance would naturally level out.

The pendulum has swung the other way as data sources have been able to more clearly define clutch performance. The working theory is that a neutral player would perform just as well in the playoffs as during the regular season. That may or may not be the case. Pitching should be better in the postseason, so actually you would expect hitters to perform a little worse in the postseason as they would in the regular season. Ortiz is known for some pretty big hits in big moments. How did he do overall in the playoffs?

  PA AVG OBP SLG HR Runs RBI SO/BB
ALDS 139 .270 .388 .513 6 16 17 29/23
ALCS 171 .255 .357 .490 8 21 30 38/22
WS 59 .455 .576 .795 3 14 14 5/14
TOT 369 .289 .404 .543 17 51 61 72/59

The usual standard for clutch performers is that they get better when the stakes are higher. Fortunately, the good folks at baseball-reference have broken down performance based on low, medium, and high leveraged situations. We don’t need that here. Ortiz was better in the World Series than he was during the league championship series and during the divisional round. The Red Sox won every World Series they participated in. He obviously had a lot to do with that.

The theories and relevance of clutch performance is one of the big bones of contention between those behind WAR and Bill James and his win shares formula. The when of performance is often overlooked in WAR as they assume everything evens out over time. They focus on the what. Yet, if there is a positive variance in when players perform at their best then it could be argued that someone like Ortiz would be more valuable than his index numbers would otherwise indicate.

  PA AVG OBP SLG HR Runs RBI SO/BB
Low 4162 .271 .368 .532 228 443 448 1.41
Medium 3921 .299 .388 .571 212 493 655 1.31
High 1998 .292 .388 .556 101 481 619 1.20

Anyone that has paid attention to baseball knows this is not a normal distribution. Some players seem to get worse as the situations grow more tense. The best you can usually hope for is for performance to remain level as the situations get more tense. Ortiz was far better in clutch situations than he was in low pressure situations. This could be seen in his rates of contact as well. Either way you slice it, Ortiz has to be considered in a different light due to the fact that he was such a clutch performer.

The Steroid Issue 

To make matters more complicated, David Ortiz was mentioned in the Mitchell Report in 2003 in connection to steroid use. He supposedly tested positive for steroids when MLB was going through its non-penalty phase of steroid testing. Of course, no official statement was made as to such and nothing was ever reported as to what substance he tested positive for if he ever tested positive at all.

Ortiz has always denied using and he never tested positive once testing was made official after 2003. What’s more, his performance didn’t really change following 2003 when he joined the Red Sox. We could assume that he used steroids to go from being cut in Minnesota to being an all-star in Boston, but we would then have to suppose that he continued using throughout his career to maintain that level of performance.

This is where the guessing game goes off the tracks. History shows that players discover their game at different times. There are general rules of thumb that we see with most players, but not every player fits the model. Are we to assume that everyone that suddenly discovers more power discovered it based on a needle? We can in some instances when we know what happened. We can when there is no other logical explanation. Ortiz didn’t necessarily get stronger in Boston. He played in a better ballpark for him and he played in a better lineup. Those factors had just as much to do with his power surge as any potential steroid use.

Final Verdict 

The additional of the steroids question makes Ortiz’s candidacy hard to predict. Usually, steoids would destroy that candidacy as it did for the likes of Roger Clemens and Barry Bonds. On the other hand, the rumors came relatively early and he seemingly rebounded well. When in doubt I usually follow the index, but I’m just not sure how relevant the numbers are in this case. I just don’t think either WAR formula treats DHs fairly.

When James designed his win shares formula he postulated that 300 win shares was the normal dividing line between being in and out of the Hall of Fame. Like the rest of us, that wasn’t meant to be a hard and fast rule, but Ortiz’s 325 win shares would seem to put him in based on those numbers. Add in the playoff numbers and he would seemingly be put over the top. I’m inclined to put him in at this point, but it isn’t as easy as his counting numbers would make it seem.

On the Outside Looking In: First Basemen

Looking at those on the outside looking in is normally an exercise in identifying value where others have not. So, it shouldn’t be a surprise that the first base class is no exception. However, these players each hit on their own category of bias. It’s almost an exercise of opening up our minds to all different kinds of value.

We could certainly expand our list over a number of eras, but we will focus on the immediate list of players that could theoretically be selected by the new version of the Veterans Committee. The committee has been more destructive than helpful historically, but they have eliminated a large part of their largesse and have minimized their errors. Of course, their process is still less desirable than the BBWAA process.

When you picture a first baseman you normally don’t picture a gap hitter that is slick around the bag, but in this section we will look at two such players. Keith Hernandez and John Olerud challenge our very sensibility in what makes a first baseman valuable. We think of guys that hit 30 home runs or more a season and drive in 100 or more runs. If we haven’t found out by now then this article will hopefully prove that value can come in many different forms. A run saved is as good as a run produced.

The third member of our team had the type of numbers that we normally like to see, but his career was brief. Unfortunately, the BBWAA didn’t quite recognize all of his greatness because they were not clued into the importance of OBP and they were distracted by his prickly nature. Dick Allen labored in the 1960s and 1970s when players were not free to move yet. Instead, he was shipped from team to team when he had worn out his welcome. Since the media votes for the honor, relationships with the media matter. Sadly, many were not dispassionate enough to set aside his nature.

Career Value 

  bWAR fWAR WS/5 Total
Dick Allen 58.7 61.3 68.4 188.4
Keith Hernandez 60.4 59.4 62.2 182.0
John Olerud 58.2 57.3 61.0 176.5

We begin with Allen because he appears on top of our list and we have an immediate issue to address. Allen stands here because he played more games at first base than any other position. However, he did play a number of games at third and it could be argued that he belongs there. More of his valuable seasons came there and you could argue that more of his peak value came there.

How much it matters is debatable. In the index we compare players with players from their own position. Our standard floats from position to position and it is likely that the standard at third won’t be as rigorous as it is at first base. The fact that he clears the bar here indicates that he would likely clear the bar there.

Hernandez and Olerud are clearly first basemen, but they don’t have the kind of counting numbers that most of the voters look for. Yet, they played on very good teams that utilized their skill sets to create wins. As Billy Beane famously said in Moneyball, “are we finding players or selling jeans?” Whether they looked the part or not matters not. As we will see when we break down the numbers, they have a strong case.

Peak Value 

  bWAR fWAR WS/5 Total Index
Dick Allen 54.5 54.9 59.0 168.4 356.8
Keith Hernandez 51.3 50.9 51.0 153.2 335.2
John Olerud 46.8 47.1 46.4 140.3 316.8

As you can see, Allen clears the bar with plenty of distance. Any time you clear the 350 win plateau your place in history is secure. If you stack his numbers up against the likes of Willie McCovey, Tony Perez, and Harmon Killebrew you will see that his name is missing in Cooperstown. All three are a testament to the importance of on base percentage. Stealing first base is the most important skill in the game and it is the one skill that the BBWAA often overlooked 40 and 50 years ago.

If we were into following straight mathematical guidelines we would say Hernandez is in and Olerud is out. While that would be easy, the index was never designed to make quick and easy decisions. There are a number of players I have gone back and forth on and he is one of those. Often, it takes time for a player like Hernandez or Olerud to be fully appreciated. Both players have considerable defensive reputations, but we should be systematic in our approach. So, we will begin by looking their offensive numbers.

Offensive Production

  wOBA wRC+ OW% BPO
Dick Allen .400 155 .741 .899
Keith Hernandez .365 131 .668 .786
John Olerud .377 130 .638 .857

We had been using OPS+ and wRC+, but they are largely redundant statistics. Plus, wOBA (weighted on base average) describes their on base skills more. The problem with all of these numbers is that they measure different things. They are also weighted differently. Weighted runs created plus and offensive winning percentage are measured against the league average. wOBA and bases per out are not.

It is pretty clear that Allen is a cut above the other two across the board, but the debate between Hernandez and Olerud may rage on forever. Hernandez played in the 1970s and 1980s where offensive numbers were depressed, so we would expect his numbers to be a little worse. As we can see, when compared to the leagues average he is either equal to or superior to Olerud. When we combine this with the fielding data we get a justification for taking one and not the other. This ignores the importance of some of the numbers and what they mean in practical terms.

Offensive winning percentage is an easy number to wrap our head a round. A team of Dick Allens would win 120 games with average pitching and fielding. He isn’t the most valuable player ever, but he might be the best offensive player not in the Hall of Fame. Of course, fielding can’t be ignored, but that’s a staggering number. A team of Hernandez’s would win 108 games. That doesn’t even consider his defense which would make a team slightly above average overall defensively. Olerud would produce 103 wins and when think back to the actual list of Hall of Famers we see he would be in line with the bottom of the list.

Simply put, I love bases per out. Outs are blood currency of baseball. If you look at the majority of strategy development in the game it is in the development of strategies to either get more outs or prevent outs. We’ve seen the sacrifice bunt go by the wayside. We’ve seen extreme shifting on the defensive end to garner more outs. Teams have slowly caught on to the benefit of having players that get on base more often and accrue more value per out. The only group that moves slower than teams are the fans. We are often stuck in the batting average and home runs paradigm. Walks matter. They matter a great deal and each of these three demonstrate that in spades.

Ignoring the players from the Live Ball Era, we can see that these three players belong simply by looking at these two numbers. In many cases, the players in the Hall of Fame embody both the power numbers and the production that we look for. Still, if someone gives you the production then who cares how they do it?

  OW% BPO
Eddie Murray .624 .787
Willie McCovey .718 .900
Harmon Killebrew .706 .899
Tony Perez .619 .737
Dick Allen .741 .899
Keith Hernandez .668 .786
John Olerud .638 .857

Every time I look at Tony Perez the worse he looks. Numbers take on more meaning when we have a larger frame of reference. In other words, when we can compare players to a standard that is accepted as good enough then we have a better idea whether new candidates are good enough. Clearly, Dick Allen should have been in all along. It is fair to point out that all four players in Cooperstown enjoyed longer peaks and longer careers. Still, when someone is as good if not better it is a glaring omission.

Hernandez and Olerud are not as good as some but are better than both Murray and Perez. Granted, those players did enjoy lengthy careers, but placing these players together gives us an inkling that both might belong. Naturally, we haven’t even mentioned defense and this is where Hernandez supposedly shines.

Hernandez Fielding Contemporaries

  dWAR DWS TZ TZGG WSGG GG
Keith Hernandez 1.3 34.9 117 8 1 11
Eddie Murray -11.6 36.9 61 1 6 3
Steve Garvey -11.6 37.9 0 0 7 4
Don Mattingly -6.2 29.0 33 1 3 9
Pete O’Brien -1.3 29.6 69 1 5 0
Chris Chambliss -7.9 29.1 31 1 1 1
Wally Joyner -5.1 28.9 52 0 2 0
Tony Perez -6.6 24.2 13 1 0 0
Kent Hrbek -7.7 28.8 16 1 1 0

When someone has the reputation of a Keith Hernandez we have to first compare him with his contemporaries to see if that reputation is warranted. Here we see a hodgepodge of numbers that all mean something different, but we see Hernandez on top of the heap for most of them. There are a few notable exceptions that we should look at. First, we have win shares. Win shares are compared to replacement level and no one has negative value in win shares. So, the players that play the most have the most value. Steve Garvey and Eddie Murray enjoyed much longer careers, so their place on top is more a testament to their durability than their greatness.

The win share Gold Gloves are relevant (more relevant than the actual Gold Gloves) but they are largely tied to durability and whether a player played on a good team or not. Interestingly enough, while Pete O’Brien did not play long he got short-changed by the Rawlings company. He was a shade better than Don Mattingly at the same time, but Mattingly won the nine Gold Gloves. Life isn’t fair.

Whether Hernandez is the best defensive first baseman in history as some claim remains to be seen. The numbers above demonstrate that Hernandez was objectively the best of the time period and definitely deserves a spot in Cooperstown based on the combination of his fielding and hitting. Since Allen and Olerud played in different eras we have to check in and see how they stack up.

Defensive Production

  dWAR TZ DWS FG
Dick Allen -16.3 -110 26.8 -109.0
Keith Hernandez 1.3 117 34.9 119.0
John Olerud -1.4 103 39.1 98.8

Dick Allen was a butcher by all accepted standards on fielding. That might be one reason why he is not in the Hall of Fame. The thing is that fielding’s value is relative depending on the position. First base is just not that important as compared to the other positions on the diamond. That leaves us Hernandez and Olerud. Both were very good fielders and it enhances both of their overall values when it comes to Cooperstown.

Fangraphs (the last column) had numerous iterations of fielding numbers before they adopted UZR. They ended up being very similar to total zone runs (which they also kept). The addition of these numbers say the same thing as the other categories, but we include it because we include fWAR and we want to make sure Fangraphs is represented on the table.

My first inclination is to put all three in the Hall of Fame. Allen and Hernandez definitely deserve their spot while Olerud is more debatable. Still, he was a very good all-around player for a number of years. He also has a prominent place on the best regular season team of all-time. I’m not sure how much extra credit that affords him, but if it breaks a tie then so be it.